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Revealing and Thereby Tempering the
Abuses of Government-Created
Evidence in Criminal Trials
Robert P. Mosteller†
INTRODUCTION
I am delighted to add my contribution to this
symposium in honor of the academic achievements of Professor
Margaret Berger. I do this through three points. The first is
Professor Berger’s commitment to providing the jury with
information to do its job more effectively and her faith in that
institution when properly armed with adequate information.
The second is her particular remedy of requiring the
recordation of evidence created by the government, and
revealing that record to the jury as a way of tempering the
corrupting influence of the government’s hand in the evidence
development process. I heartily endorse these positions and
find them to have widespread and enduring applicability.
Finally, I comment on an admirable characteristic that I have
found constant throughout Professor Berger’s work that adds
to its brilliance: her reasoned judgment.
I anchor my comments in arguments Professor Berger
made regarding the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution at a time when
Ohio v. Roberts1 provided the controlling paradigm, before it
was replaced by Crawford v. Washington.2 I do not wish to
suggest that Professor Berger was a defender of the
trustworthiness/reliability system of Roberts, for she was not.3
†

J. Dickson Phillips Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North
Carolina School of Law. I want to thank Professors Ed Cheng and Jeff Powell for their
comments on an earlier draft of this essay.
1
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
2
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
3
See Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation
Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 605-13
(1992) (recognizing the “illusory protection afforded to a defendant by the evidentiary
version of confrontation” and arguing to give greater protection against admission of
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She did, however, attempt to make that system more protective
of the central principles she believed the Sixth Amendment
embodied.
Some of her ideas may fit within the Crawford
framework as its detail is fleshed out in the future by the
Supreme Court and lower courts. Some of these ideas may not,
but these sound arguments are still worth noting since they
may be embodied in legislation or in a new generation of
procedural protections.
I.

AN INSIGHTFUL AND INFLUENTIAL BRIEF IN IDAHO V.
WRIGHT: PROTECTING THE DEFENDANT’S
CONFRONTATION RIGHT BY PROVIDING THE JURY WITH
THE BASIS TO ASSESS THE DECLARANT’S STATEMENT

My first specific example of a contribution by Professor
Berger is the amicus brief she authored for the American Civil
Liberties Union in Idaho v. Wright.4 In accord with her basic
position, the Supreme Court concluded that the state had failed
to demonstrate the requisite showing of reliability for a
hearsay statement admitted under the catchall exception and
reversed the conviction.5 As I stated in an earlier article,
“Precisely why the Court decided to find the hearsay in Wright
inadmissible because not supported by particularized indicia of
reliability cannot be clearly established. However, the decision
may have flowed from the arguments made by Professor
Margaret Berger in an amicus brief.”6
Indeed, one finds many echoes of Professor Berger’s
arguments in the facts described in Justice O’Connor’s opinion
in Wright that apparently led to the outcome in the case.
Unfortunately as discussed in later parts of this essay, one does
not find in the Court’s opinion all of her proposed solutions.7

statements produced by government authorities). This article is discussed further at
infra note 31 and accompanying text.
4
497 U.S. 805 (1990).
5
Id. at 827.
6
Robert P. Mosteller, Testing the Testimonial Concept and Exceptions to
Confrontation: “A Little Child Shall Lead Them”, 82 IND. L.J. 917, 934 n.53 (2007)
(citing Amicus Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990) (No. 89-260)).
7
Professor Berger noted that “[i]ndicia of reliability are ‘easy to come by,’
[and that] . . . one part of the majority opinion in Idaho v. Wright reads like a handbook
instructing prosecutors how to offer a child’s hearsay statement with requisite
‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’” See Berger, supra note 3, at 606.
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Wright involved testimony of Dr. John Jambura that
contained the “statements” of a two-and-one-half-year-old child,
Kathy Wright. These statements led to the conviction of
Kathy’s mother for “lewd conduct with a minor” for allegedly
assisting a male companion in raping both Kathy and her five
and one-half year old sister.8 Kathy’s statements were admitted
through Dr. Jambura, and she did not testify because the trial
court found that she was “‘not capable of communicating to the
jury.’”9
Professor Berger emphasized the importance of the
confrontation right to the jury being able to perform its role:
“The statements made by Kathy to Dr. Jambura lie at the
heart of this case. Yet, for a number of reasons, the jury could
not assess their reliability with any degree of confidence.”10
Chief among these reasons was that “it is not even clear from
the doctor’s testimony precisely what words Kathy used.”11 The
statement “is not being reported in its entirety, contains too
few details to confirm its consistency with the supposed event,
and was elicited in response to leading questions designed to
confirm the questioner’s hypothesis.”12 She noted the lack of
“any verbatim record of the interview,”13 which she would argue
in a later article should be turned into a potential requirement
and remedy.
Professor Berger argued that the key role of the
Confrontation Clause is to enable the jury to do its job of
deciding guilt and innocence in the difficult cases where the
jurors’ albeit imperfect human instincts and judgments are all
that stand between a just and an unjust verdict. With a child
as young as Kathy, she emphasized that the jury needed to see
the child testify (or at least have her exact words) so it could
assess whether Kathy had reached the developmental stage
where she “underst[ood] the need to tell the truth, or could
distinguish fact from fantasy.”14 Additionally, the jury could not
evaluate Kathy’s capacity for communicative speech.15 Professor
8

See Wright, 497 U.S. at 808-12.
Id. at 809.
10
Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 9, Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990) (No. 89-260) [hereinafter Amicus
Brief in Wright].
11
Id. at 10.
12
Id. at 16-17.
13
Id. at 4.
14
Id. at 9.
15
Id. at 9-10.
9
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Berger recognized that “[f]actors such as the speed and flow of
a witness’ speech, as well as articulation, intonation,
mannerisms of speech and use of nonverbal modes of
communication, on direct and on cross examination, enter into
a jury’s assessment.”16 As she acknowledged, cross-examination
of young children is a difficult enterprise, potentially made
even more difficult by the psychological process of
confabulation whereby details from imagination and earlier
responses merge with the actual memory of the event to make
the child erroneously believe a flawed version of the events.17
But it should still be provided. She summarized a number of
concerns as follows:
The jury cannot evaluate accurately whether [Kathy’s] statement
recounts a past event, or is the consequence of suggestive
questioning in alien surroundings, in the presence of strangers, after
undergoing what must have been an extremely unpleasant physical
examination. In the absence of Kathy, the jury did not have the
information needed to assess the appropriate weight to be given
Kathy’s statement.18

Professor Berger noted the special difficulty posed when
the alleged statement of the child is presented through an
expert, which gives her purported testimony through an
impressive medium but without adequate testing. “Interposing
the expert between the declarant and the jury deprives the jury
of its right to make determinations of credibility.”19 Having Dr.
Jambura on the stand was not, she argued, an adequate
substitute. “Cross-examining the expert is not the equivalent of
cross-examining the declarant upon whose statements the
expert is relying in expressing his opinion. To the contrary, the
defendant may be deprived of his rights to confrontation if he
has no access to the declarant upon whom the expert is
relying.”20
The difficulty she notes here for statements introduced
through experts reverberates into the new system created by
Crawford. A clear challenge yet to be addressed by the
Supreme Court under the “testimonial statement” approach is
whether its determination that statements not “offered for the

16
17
18
19
20

Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
Id.
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truth” are outside Confrontation Clause protection21 applies to
statements admitted for the limited purpose of supporting the
expert’s opinion. Although the answer under the hearsay rules
is that such statements are not offered for the truth, the
answer should be different under Confrontation Clause
analysis for the straightforward reason that Professor Berger
offers. Unfortunately, that difference appears to be eluding
many lower courts presently as they use the wooden analysis of
following the hearsay definition22 and not the importance of
confrontation to enable the jury to evaluate the accuracy of the
second-hand account.
Professor Berger’s arguments are simple, powerful, and
correct. As part of an overall pattern of rights within the Sixth
Amendment, a major role of the Confrontation Clause is to
empower jurors to do their task properly and accurately. The
goal is the testing of the witness’ version of events in front of
the lay factfinders, part of our inherited overall system of live
witnesses presenting their evidence at a public trial. Her
specific vision, which I believe is sound, is not of a
Confrontation Clause that provides a “get out of jail free” right
but rather a guarantee that seeks to maximize the actual
“confrontation” of the jury with the grist from which its
members can reach their own judgments. That involves both
the declarant’s direct testimony and the testing through crossexamination by counsel for the accused in front of those jurors.23
In support of the Idaho Supreme Court,24 Professor
Berger argued that the Court should require the recording of
children’s statements when elicited by prosecutorial authorities
in adversarial situations.25 Although her proposal was out of
sync with both the Wright Court and today’s Court, the
suggestion of using “prophylactic rules as the instrumental
21

See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) (citing Tennessee
v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985) in which a clearly testimonial statement and
confession by a co-defendant that differed substantially from the defendant’s version of
the events was used to refute the defendant’s claim that he was coerced into a
confession that tracked the co-defendant’s statements).
22
See Julie A. Seaman, Triangulating Testimonial Hearsay: The
Constitutional Boundaries of Expert Opinion Testimony, 96 GEO. L.J. 827, 846-48, 85457 (2008) (noting lower court rulings that such statements are exempted from
confrontation scrutiny and the fallacy of the reasoning).
23
See Amicus Brief in Wright, supra note 10, at 7.
24
See State v. Wright, 775 P.2d 1224, 1230 (1989) (concluding that because
there was no audio or videotape of the interview, the dangers of unreliability could
“never be fully assessed”).
25
See Amicus Brief in Wright, supra note 10, at 20-27.
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means to further constitutional objectives”26 stands in excellent
company with Sixth Amendment precedent and with good
judgment that is being utilized today in many sectors as we
recognize the need to protect the innocent.27
Finally, she argued that corroboration of the statement’s
truth by external evidence could not be a basis for declaring the
statement trustworthy and in turn could not justify its receipt
under the Roberts’ trustworthiness/reliability system.28 The
Court reached this same conclusion largely applying hearsay
theory.29 Professor Berger argued for it on a different and more
enduring basis. It was part of her broader view that the
purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to enable the jury to
assess the declarant’s statement, which was part of a
theoretical vision that became clear in the article to which I
turn next. Her vision is that the Confrontation Clause has a
particular role in protecting the accused from government
developed evidence. In her brief, she articulated one
ramification of that view:
If confrontation is to be excused when corroborating evidence exists,
the constitutional right . . . will become meaningless. Prosecutors
would be encouraged to rely on weak witnesses whom they would be
able to bolster by hearsay evidence that would not violate the
Confrontation Clause because it was corroborated. Such
bootstrapping would spell an end to the constitutional right
embodied in the clause . . . .30

II.

FORMULATING THE FUNDAMENTAL ARGUMENT TO
CONTROL MUCH GOVERNMENT-CREATED HEARSAY BY
REQUIRING THE RECORDING OF THE PROCESS OF
CREATION

My second specific point of reference is Professor
Berger’s
article,
The
Deconstitutionalization
of
the
Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint
26

Id. at 20.
See Matthew D. Thurlow, Lights, Camera, Action: Video Cameras as Tools
of Justice, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 771, 772-73 (2005) (recognizing a
broad public campaign to record as a means of protecting the innocent and noting that
three states through judicial decision and three others through legislative action have
mandated recording interrogations).
28
See Amicus Brief in Wright, supra note 10, at 19-20.
29
See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 819-21 (1990). The Court did recognize
the danger of “bootstrapping” weak evidence into the case, see id. at 823, but it did not
give the prominence to this danger of prosecution created evidence that Professor
Berger’s prosecutorial restraint model would justify.
30
Amicus Brief in Wright, supra note 10, at 20.
27
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Model.31 In this article, she argues for special scrutiny for
hearsay statements made by declarants to government agents.
Although the Court did not cite her article as influencing its
determination to adopt a new paradigm in Crawford, Justice
Breyer did cite it as one of three academic articles suggesting a
new approach in his statement of personal dissatisfaction with
the Roberts approach prior to the Crawford decision.32
Professor Berger’s position that special attention should
be paid to statements elicited by government agents is largely
consistent with the Court’s new testimonial statement
approach. In Crawford, the Court stated that “[i]nvolvement of
government officers in the production of testimony with an eye
toward trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial
abuse—a fact borne out time and again throughout a history
with which the Framers were keenly familiar.”33 While her
remedies do not fully appear to fit the new paradigm, my point
is not directed towards the mismatch. It is instead about the
correctness of the central insight and the importance of her
basic approach and remedy.
That approach is to give special scrutiny to the
situations where government agents and the prosecution are
involved during the formation of evidence and have the ability
to affect its development and content. In those situations, her
remedy is to require additional safeguards that would enable
the jury to assess the reliability of the process and the impact
of the government’s role in it.34
If the declarant is produced by the prosecution as a
witness at trial, ordinarily no special protection is required
even though the government had a role in securing the
statement. However, additional protections are needed if the
declarant is particularly vulnerable. For vulnerable witnesses,
such as mentally unstable witnesses, children, or someone like

31

Berger, supra note 3, at 605-13.
See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 140 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring).
Justice Breyer cited Professor Berger’s article and two others, one by
Professor Richard Friedman and a book by Akhil Amar. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE
CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1997); Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation:
The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011 (1998). The majority in Crawford
cited the other two but omitted Professor Berger’s article. Perhaps the reason is that
she was critical of what appears to be the majority’s narrow, formalistic approach and
its argument to exempt all other hearsay rather than to give greater protection to
statements secured by government agents. See Berger, supra note 3, at 563-64.
33
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 (2004).
34
Berger, supra note 3 at 561-62.
32
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the victim in United States v. Owens35 who was suffering from a
head injury, the prosecution would be required to produce
either a tape of the interview or transcript of the hearing where
the statement was produced.36 For coconspirator statements,
she draws a distinction between those made to true
conspirators who are private citizens involved in crime and
acting independent of the government, and those made to
undercover agents and recognized informants. Because of the
paramount concern of government-shaped statements, she
would require exclusion of statements made to government
agents and informants who, at the time of the statements, were
already cooperating with the government, unless either the
declarant was produced as a witness at trial or the
conversation with the government agent or informant was
recorded.37 She argues the same approach—the required
recording of statements—should be used with children when
the person conducting the interview is doing so at the behest of
the police.38
Under the testimonial statement approach, significant
protection will be provided in a number of the situations
35

484 U.S. 55 (1988) (involving brain damaged victim of an assault who
identified the defendant as the perpetrator during a pre-trial identification procedure).
36
See Berger, supra note 3, at 607-08 & n.207.
37
See id. at 608-09.
38
See id. at 611-12.
I have been of two minds regarding Professor Berger’s approach to
videotaping children’s statements. On the one hand, I took issue with what I
understood to be her approach of permitting the statements to be introduced without
confrontation, even if accusatory, as long as the interview was videotaped. See Robert
P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine Under the
Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 752 n.293
(1993) (noting substantial agreement with Professor Berger’s approach but disagreeing
that documenting the conversation would provide an adequate alternative). On the
other, I recognized that there are very good reasons for videotaping early statements by
children and that it would be unfortunate if Crawford caused the practice to be
discontinued. See Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and
Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 539-40 n.144 (2005)
(noting specifically the reduction of trauma from multiple interviews).
In the end, I am a firm believer in realistic solutions, and the
documentation of the interview through mechanical recording is a very sound secondbest solution that would provide the jury with a far better look into the circumstances
and accuracy of the incriminating statements than does recital of its contents from the
perspective of the government agent who obtained the statement. My preferred
solution is not exclusion of the statement but both the recorded conversation and the
actual appearance of the child on the stand for cross-examination, despite the
difficulties in such cross-examinations. Clearly, a mechanical recording of the
statement is better for the jury determining the truth than the necessarily selective
testimony of a likely biased human observer, and since the law may be heading toward
entirely exempting these interviews in most situations from Confrontation Clause
scrutiny, recording may be the only realistic protection remaining.
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considered above where the statement is elicited by a publicly
disclosed investigative agent with the purpose of establishing
facts about past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.39 By contrast, coconspirator statements are
apparently entirely exempt from scrutiny under the
Confrontation Clause, whether made to true conspirators or to
those who are government agents if their status as agents are
unknown.40 Statements by children to non-law enforcement
professionals who question the child with both investigative
and non-law-enforcement interests in mind—what I term
mixed purpose interviews—are in an uncertain category.41
Moreover, Professor Berger’s approach of skepticism
toward government generated hearsay and enabling the jury to
make a better decision by the required creation and disclosure
of mechanical recordings of the interviews remains sound even
if not part of the testimonial statement approach of Sixth
Amendment confrontation right. As the right matures through
further rulings by the Court, perhaps a flexibility and nuance
will be developed to supplement the right of confrontation, and
ancillary protections of the type she suggests may be embraced.
If not, the fundamental idea is no less sound. It simply
must get its support from another source and find its command
in legislation or a different constitutional right, such as due
process. My recent interests have prompted me to examine the
role of the innocence movement in motivating and shaping
criminal procedure reforms.42 One area of overlap that relates
39

See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
In Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2691 n.6 (2008), the Court stated
that coconspirators statements “would probably never be . . . testimonial” because they
must be made “in furtherance of the conspiracy.” This statement suggests an exclusive
focus on the purpose or intention of the declarant in making the statement and
suggests no different treatment when it is a government agent who elicits the
coconspirator’s statement.
41
See Mosteller, supra note 6, at 968-75 (recognizing the uneven treatment of
statements, including videotaped statements, made for multiple purposes and the
capacity of those formulating the process to give the questioning an apparently noninvestigate primary purpose); Robert P. Mosteller, Giles v. California: Avoiding Serious
Damage to Crawford’s Limited Revolution, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 675, 682 (2009)
(noting an apparent or likely trend toward courts finding mixed purpose statements
nontestimonial).
42
See Robert P. Mosteller, Why Defense Attorneys Cannot, But Do, Care
About Innocence, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (2010); Robert P. Mosteller, The Special
Threat of Informants to the Innocent Who Are Not Innocents: Producing “First Drafts,”
Recording Incentives, and Taking a Fresh Look at the Evidence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
519 (2009) [hereinafter Producing Informant’s “First Drafts”]; Robert P. Mosteller,
Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The
Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257 (2008);
40
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to Professor Berger’s insight is the control of informants who
have played a role in the conviction of a number of innocent
individuals for crimes they did not commit. My particular focus
is on the danger of false informant testimony to those who are
innocent of the specific crime charged but who are not
strangers to crime.43
The evidence that I find critical and subject to remedy is
the testimony of informants who change or refine their version
of events after contact with the police. Like the hearsay that is
of concern to Professor Berger under the Confrontation Clause,
this testimony sometimes bears the imprint of governmental
agents who “turn” a criminal suspect into a cooperating witness
by eliciting statements that incriminate the ultimate target of
the prosecution. One of my remedies is based on an argument
that the constitutional right under the Due Process Clause to
have
exculpatory
information,
including
impeaching
information, should have practical protection. Like Professor
Berger, I argue that the police-citizen encounter should be
recorded.44 Because of their exposure to punishment and their
strong desire to please the police and the prosecution, many of
these informants are arguably vulnerable witnesses under her
terminology.45
There is no “magic bullet” to cure the dangers of
informant testimony, particularly when defendants with past
criminal involvement are concerned. Many of those defendants
are clearly guilty and many of them are also threats to the
insiders who might be able to offer incriminating testimony.
Moreover, because of their general involvement in crime,
investigative authorities will be receptive to the story the
informants are offering, and informants will often have the raw
material to fashion convincing false testimony from real or
imagined past activities of the target or from the conduct of
those who actually were responsible for the crime. Informants
may be important to the justice system, but their testimony,
which is sometimes false, is also dangerous to it.

Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications: A
Fundamental Failure to “Do Justice”, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337 (2007).
43
See Mosteller, Producing Informant’s “First Drafts”, supra note 42, at 522.
44
Id.
45
Professor Bennett Gershman explicitly categorizes cooperating witnesses
as vulnerable to suggestive questions along with children and eyewitnesses. See
Bennett L. Gershman, Witness Coaching by Prosecutors, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 829, 844
(2002).
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Likely the only realistic protection for those who are
innocent that is not too costly from a law enforcement
perspective is to provide a more complete picture of the process
to the jury. My proposal is, with Professor Berger, to require
the recording of what I term the “first drafts” of informant
testimony when such statements are produced after contact
with criminal investigators.46
If significantly inconsistent with the informant’s
testimony, the production of those statements is already
constitutionally required by the Brady doctrine.47 If consistent
with the informant’s testimony, production should only benefit
the government. Thus, there might seem little theoretical
reason why the statements are not produced. However,
practicality, adversarial incentives, and the fear that the
process of “turning” the informant cannot withstand disclosure
stand in the way.
Critically, most early statements are not recorded, and
the fact that they are inconsistent remains unknown or
undisclosed to the defense. It is the defense that is motivated to
carefully examine the process and point out the changes in the
story. Those on the police and prosecution side in many
marginal situations do not have the mindset to notice and
disclose inconvenient facts, which may be assumed to be
innocuous under the sincerely held view that the defendant is
guilty. More recording and disclosure should have a rightful
role.
III.

CONCLUSION: A CAREER CHARACTERIZED BY REASONED
JUDGMENT

I close by observing that Professor Berger’s ideas are not
only creative, but also have impact because wrapped into them
are the intensity of her serious consideration and her attention
to her craft as a practitioner, critic, and life-long student of the
46

So as not to inhibit police-suspect conversations and to provide a
recognizable “trigger point,” I would impose the requirement of recording at the point
the issue of a benefit to the informant is broached. See Mosteller, Producing
Informant’s “First Drafts,” supra note 42, at 568-69.
47
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (finding the failure of the
prosecution to provide potentially exculpatory evidence to the defense to be a due
process violation). In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), the Supreme Court
characterized its ruling in United States v. Giglio, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), to be that
“[i]mpeachment evidence . . . as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady
rule,” and rejected a distinction between exculpatory evidence and impeachment
evidence. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676.
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law. For that set of characteristics I can find no better term,
nor higher praise, than reasoned judgment.48 It is present in all
that Professor Berger has done.49 It is a characteristic that is at
the heart of what I believe all of us who devoted our careers to
the law aspire.
In her long and exceptional career, Professor Margaret
Berger has contributed so much to the law, and particularly to
the development of the law of evidence, that any effort to mark
her many contributions will be inadequate.50 I have tried to
illustrate these contributions through her fundamental
insights that we must rely on the imperfect institution of the
jury to sort through our most difficult problems of proof, and
for the jury to have a chance to do its task properly, it needs
detailed and accurate information.
When the government is involved in creating evidence,
particularly hearsay, the dangers of abuse are substantial.
Declarants should be required to testify and be subject to crossexamination. In addition, one of our best and most realistic
remedies for that abuse is to require that modern technology be
employed to record in a verbatim fashion the transactions
involved in that creation. By presenting that information, we
48

The writings of the constitutional scholar and my former colleague Jeff
Powell inspire this accolade. In examining constitutional interpretation, he has coined
the termed “constitutional virtues,” which consist of (good) faith, integrity, humility,
and candor. H. Jefferson Powell, Constitutional Virtues, 9 GREEN BAG 379, 389 (2006).
In his recent book, Constitutional Conscience, Jeff expands on these fundamental
concepts. See H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL
DIMENSION OF JUDICIAL Decision 100-01 (2008) (expanding the discussion and adding
the virtue of acquiescence). A central example of what he believes should be the goal of
everyone who attempts constitutional interpretation is the Attorney General in
President Ulysses S. Grant’s administration who was asked to render an opinion on a
constitutional issue, which Powell believes was rendered in full adherence to his craft
as a lawyer and his public duties. See id. ch. 3.
In a similar vein, I mean the characterization of “reasoned judgment” as
truly a high compliment. As one who cares deeply about the practice of law and the
intellectual exploration of ideas, Professor Berger has both mastered and been true to
her craft.
49
Even before I entered law teaching, I held Professor Berger in high regard,
first encountering her work in the masterful treatise on the Federal Rules of Evidence
that she co-authored with Judge Jack Weinstein. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET
A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE (1975). I found that in almost all situations the
treatise set forth with great precision, even in the early days of the operation of the
rules, what the law was. Occasionally, it would deviate and state what the authors
thought the law should be. These deviations were always creative, and they contained
a remarkable measure of reasoned judgment. The courts may not have universally
adopted their suggestions, but when they did not, it was most often a matter of judicial
misjudgment.
50
For example, I have not even referred to her exceptional contribution to the
analysis of the admission of scientific evidence and her service on multiple committees
of the National Academy of Sciences.
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better equip the jury to assess the value of the evidence and the
value of the words of sometimes absent witnesses. Whether
formally part of a confrontation right or recognized and
guaranteed through other legal mechanisms, the insight is
sound and manageable. It clearly shows the reasoned judgment
of an insightful and committed legal scholar, who practiced her
craft in ways that all in the field of evidence would hope to
emulate.

